Introduction 2
The focus of this book is on how governments may effectively use recent advances in the understanding of human behavior to guide their efforts to modify people's behavior. To date, the insights of behavioral ethics that have completely revolutionized the business and management fields have yet to be applied in legal theory and policy research, especially in the context of legal enforcement and compliance. The growing recognition that misconduct can be facilitated by structural issues and is not just the product of a few "bad apples" has important implications for the creation and finetuning of institutional design and enforcement mechanisms. States need to modify their regulatory roles and functions based on the understanding that discrimination does not just stem from certain employers who hate minorities, that corruption is not just about greedy individuals, or that trade secrets are not just divulged for mercenary motives.
This book argues that the good-people rationale-the idea that ordinary people could engage in all types of wrongdoing without being aware of the full meaning of their behavior-greatly complicates the regulatory challenge of states. Because of various psychological and social mechanisms that prevent people from recognizing their wrongdoing and encourage them to feel as if they are far more moral, unbiased, and law abiding than they actually are, individuals today are less likely to react, at least not explicitly, to classical legal signals, which they view as directed to other, "bad" people.
Similar self-serving mechanisms affecting their perception of social norms and fairness cause people to have very inaccurate views of the normative status of their behavior.
Moreover, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the good-people rationale and, as we will show from the literature, there is clearly more than one type of good person-different people use a variety of different mechanisms to justify their unethical and illegal behavior. We do not yet know how "good" the good people are in terms of their awareness and ability to control their conduct. Nor can we accurately quantify ex-ante the ratio of good to bad people in society with regard to any particular behavior. Although we appreciate the need to address the misconduct of good and bad people differently, we do BE is more concerned with how our self-interest affects us implicitly than with how it shapes our explicit choices. In light of these differences, the fact that BLE is so popular within the legal literature 10 while BE is almost entirely ignored, 11 is quite counterintuitive. 12 As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 2-which focuses on the psychological foundations of behavioral ethics-good people 13 are those who find themselves in 10 E.g. Sunstein, C. R. (1999) . Behavioral law and economics: a progress report. American Law and Economics Review, 1(1/2), 115-157; Langevoort, D. C. (1998) . Behavioral theories of judgment and decision making in legal scholarship: A literature review. Vand. L. Rev., 51, 1499. 11 in which their desires affect the types of information they pay attention to and how they process it. 14 Self-deception also plays an important role in their ability to accurately assess the nature of their actions and motives, causing them to believe they are acting more ethically than they actually are. 15 To use a common example, a mayor will find it difficult admitting to himself that his behavior is driven by anything other than the benefit of the city he runs-even if his actions seem to be, on the surface, motivated primarily by his own self-interest.
As discussed in more details in chapter 2 and especially in chapter 9 that focuses on implicit corruption. The BE literature has produced many important and counterintuitive insights. For example, people behave less ethically in groups than when alone 16 and also when they are acting on behalf of other people, rather than for themselves. Another example is that good people might ignore blatant conflicts of interest, having few qualms about accepting tickets to a sports event from a client, although they would shy away from taking a monetary bribe. Individuals who consider themselves to be "good" based on their past behavior may permit themselves to bend the rules (moral licensing) and are more likely to make unethical decisions when time constraints increase. 17 These findings described in the literature pose a substantial challenge to the ability of the state to change the behavior of the public across many domains of law.
These psychological mechanisms not only amplify the effect of self-interest but also tend to limit peoples' awareness of the role of self-interest in determining their behavior. Indeed, one of the unresolved issues is the degree to which individuals are aware of their ethical behavior, 18 and BE research has proceeded along several paths that argue different views on this topic. On the one hand, Marquardt and Hoeger 19 showed that individuals make decisions based on implicit rather than explicit attitudes. Along similar lines, when examining the automatic system, Moore and Loewenstein 20 found that the effect of self-interest is automatic, and Epley and Caruso 21 concluded that automatic processing leads to egocentric ethical interpretations 22 . However, within BE can be found theories such as Bandura's theory of moral disengagement that maps post hoc deliberative self-serving justifications, creating a taxonomy of how people come to more explicitly rationalize their unethical behavior. 23
Another body of literature that stands in contrast to BE is that on limited selfinterest, which emphasizes the role of fairness and morality in compliance with the law.
A good example is the important line of research that derives from the prosocial account of human behavior (see for example works of Stout 24 and Benkler 25 on pro-social behavior preference-I argue that it is the understanding of the importance of non-deliberative decision making that truly matters for legal theory; in addition, it is precisely the nuanced effect of this process on immoral behavior that economics fails to address.
Demonstration Through the "Self-Serving Bias"
The danger of BLE's over-reliance on economics is best demonstrated in the ways its scholarship addresses the self-serving bias. Despite this bias's clear relevance for morality and responsibility and therefore its close relationship to legal theory and enforcement, the BLE literature focuses on it instead as a deviation from rationality. For example, self-serving biases have been held responsible for people's inability to estimate correctly the probability of winning legal battles. The most famous study was conducted by Babcock and Loewenstein, 28 which showed that self-serving biases operated to reduce the likelihood of people settling out of court. This is a typical BLE finding because it assumes that people make rational decisions-that people do not pursue legal action when they are less likely to win. In this case the self-serving bias suggests a deviation from rationality, which requires intervention. But a much greater problem for law, currently being mostly ignored is the contribution of the self-serving bias to people's inability to recognize both their lack of impartiality and the dominant role that their selfinterest plays in their behavior, resulting in a crucial need for people to identify their own wrongdoing. The law and economics movement has thus limited the richness of the psychology being used in legal scholarship. The proposed legal perspective is not concerned with whether people are acting rationally. Instead, it is concerned with whether they are at fault, whether their behavior can be modified, and whether something in the situation has affected their ability to recognize their wrongdoing. Understanding these processes of decision making and how it affects questions of motivation, autonomy, and responsibility, rather than how to reach the optimal outcome, should be at the core of the new behavioral analysis of law.
As suggested earlier, both the BE and the traditional BLE literatures focus on the automatic processes that underlie people's decision making. However, they have different emphases: BE explores the automaticity of self-interest, whereas BLE examines areas in which automatic decisions undermine self-interest 29 .
Given the importance of intentionality to the law, one would expect behavioral ethics to be more central to legal scholarship than it is today. Yet BE has had less of an impact on the legal arena than has behavioral law and economics. This is primarily because of BE's structural limitations. For example, BE has a relatively large number of founding scholars, whereas BLE has two main ones: Kahneman and Tversky. As a result, BE suffers from the simultaneous development of multiple, competing paradigms, muddling the underlying points on which the literature agrees. These disagreements prevent BE from being able to propose consistent policy recommendations, which is another obstacle to its adoption within the law. Yet another limitation of BE is that it relies on a greater extent than BLE on dual reasoning mechanisms, whose concepts of automaticity, awareness, and controllability are difficult to explore and measure. How is it possible to prove that people are unaware of their selfish intentions? By contrast, classical BLE focuses on suboptimal outcomes, which can be easily examined empirically. This focus places many of the findings of BE at methodologically inferior positions relative to those of BLE.
Finally, another limitation of BE relative to BLE is the greater inability of third parties to recognize the biases of the decision making. When it comes to BLE related biases such as loss aversion, third parties can more easily recognize the fact that this bias undermines the ability of decision makers to treat loss and profit as similar consequences.
By contrast, the main mechanisms in behavioral ethics are related to self-serving biases and motivated reasoning, BE arguing for people's inability to recognize their own wrongdoing. Since these mechanisms are self-driven, it is harder for third parties to recognize that identify certain people as "good" people who simply cannot recognize their own wrong-doing. To use a hypothetical example, if a public official promoted a friend, BE suggests a whole array of mechanisms which might bias her ability to recognize the impact of personal familiarity on the objectivity of their decisions. 30 However, for third parties, BE research suggests that they will have trouble believing that the public official did not favor her friends knowingly. 31 Such a gap been the decision maker and third parties also contributes to the reluctance of BLE scholars from adopting BE based biases as part of the bounded rationality project 32 .
Despite the aforementioned limitations, bringing BE into mainstream legal scholarship is both a challenging and rewarding task and it will be the primary occupation of the present book.
The Gist of the Book
As alluded to in the previous paragraphs, in this book, I aim to create a new branch of scholarship that focuses on the rule of law in a world populated by individuals with different levels of awareness of their own unethicality. This book is based on the assumption that many of the current directions in legal enforcement research miss important elements of both behavioral and legal methods and theories. It challenges the ability of states to systematically account for non-deliberative, unethical human behavior given a legal system based largely on either sanctions or moral messages, both of which assume some level of calculation and deliberation. The legal literature on enforcement needs to undergo a major revision in its approach to the regulation of intellectual property, employment discrimination, conflict of interest, and many other legally relevant behaviors that people engage in for multiple reasons and with limited awareness of their full legal and moral meaning. In such contexts, the BE approach is especially potent and needs to be taken into account. As suggested the book criticizes the 30 See discussion in Chapter two on the objectivity bias 31 See discussion in chapter 9 (on implicit corruption) 32 Compare with the argument made in the book "Why they do it" (Soltes, E. (2016). Why They Do It: inside the mind of the white-collar criminal. PublicAffairs.) where convicted white color criminals report they were unaware at the time that their behavior was unethical or illegal. The vast majority of people find it very hard to believe that those people indeed didn't know what they were doing.
behavioral-legal scholarship for overemphasizing rationality and cognitive biases at the expense of non-deliberative choice and ethical biases. However, as is shown throughout the book, the move to dual reasoning theories should not lead to a categorical rejection of deterrence and morality. In fact, the reverse is true: one of the arguments developed in later chapters is that traditional enforcement mechanism have more than one type of effect on people, and therefore the current fascination with nudges as a means of changing behavior, along with the abandonment of traditional intervention mechanisms, is misguided.
In intuition by Haidt 35 and on moral identity by Aquino? 36 Should we ascribe a new meaning to legal ambiguity, given its contribution to such processes as self-deception?
Can states use enforcement mechanisms that distinguish between intentional and situational wrongdoers?
In general, I argue that we should separate between situations of specific individuals-where we need to define ex post what is the level of responsibility of a given individual who is on trial given his or her own limited awareness-and situations where we examine ex ante how to mobilize a given population, where our focus is on the collective. The first type of situation is the traditional view of law, but the fact that current studies show that ethical awareness is limited might not be enough to lead to normative change without more research. However, when it comes to ex-ante intervention, even when we cannot fully determine what is the strength of the nondeliberative component in people's ethical motivation, we are able to predict that this component is likely to change the behavior of an unknown proportion of the population and hence should affect the ex-ante design of law.
In subsequent chapters, I attempt to bridge the gap between the new findings of the behavioral ethics approach to behavior and existing methods used to modify behavior.
The new behavioral approaches to law enforcement assume that individuals are motivated to engage in illegal conduct by more than the pursuit of material self-interest.
These approaches collide with the traditional outlook, requiring a broad theoretical and empirical comparison of both traditional enforcement mechanisms and non-traditional measures to understand how states may be able to cope with bad deeds carried out by people with a variety of motivations and levels of awareness. I explore the meaning of these variations across people, types of behavior, and legal doctrines. The underlying assumption of BE regarding the complex role played by the "self" in ethical decision making is clearly problematic for legal theory. BE claims that many of the claims about the responsibility of individuals as moral agents for their actions neglect the impact of the situation in which the decision-making process is taking place. It may be that the main driver of the individual's behavior is the situation and not the individual's current self-view. Furthermore, the automaticity of the self-enhancement process creates a "responsibility gap" for the individual who is not completely aware of the ethicality of his or her actions, and therefore cannot be held responsible for them. A possible way of bridging this gap is through "nudges" and by designing the situation so that it enhances moral awareness and calculated decision making.
The argument that I develop throughout the book is that the current level of knowledge that BE is able to provide is limited, especially with regard to important questions from a legal perspective, and therefore it is not able to provide policy makers with a clear list of recommendations on how laws should be changed. We lack sufficient knowledge about individuals' awareness to the unethicality of their behavior and their ability to control them. 37 The psychological and social mechanisms, which I describe in detail in the next chapter, paint a complex picture of human character according to which people mostly seek to promote their self-interest as long as they can feel good about themselves. 38 Based on this theory, if we allow people to choose how to behave, many good people might resort to self-deception mechanisms, such as moral disengagement or elastic justification, and take advantage 37 See Hochman et al. supra note 14 conflicting results with regard to physiological indications of dishonesty among people. 38 See for example, Mazar, Amir and Ariely, Supra note 8. most effective legal intervention for a given situation, we measure not only short-term effects but also factors such as legitimacy, perception of the rule of law, and durability of behavioral changes?
For the interaction between behavior-based regulation and the broader concept of law to be meaningful, it is necessary to identify the steps that would allow psychological knowledge to be generalized to the societal level rather than remaining at the individual level. The ideal behavioral approach to law, advocated by this book, must be sensitive to various normative and institutional factors such as trust, legitimacy, and legal culture.
Only by combining the behavioral approach with institutional and normative ones can we create a coherent theoretical framework for non-traditional instruments that states can use to achieve greater success than with earlier, narrower approaches. Integrative behavioral research, which explores and analyzes the approaches that government should follow to regulate various types of unethicality in society, can provide policy makers with the methods they need across all legal contexts, going beyond the current focus on energy savings, pension planning, and food consumption; these methods can reach into areas where traditional enforcement methods have failed to produce sustainable change because of their limited focus. 43 The BE paradigms require revisiting many of the existing behavioral models of legal regulation and enforcement, which for the most part have relied on the assumption of deliberateness and rationality. These questions need to be answered. What is the optimal use of incentives? Should we replace traditional enforcement mechanisms with nudge interventions? What should be our attitude toward the expressive function of the law, the effect of fairness, or the interaction between incentives and fairness? Furthermore, in contrast to behavioral economics, which deals with biases that prevent people from behaving in a desirable way (e.g., saving more, eating healthier), from the BE perspective, many people behave in a way that they consider to be desirable, even after they have had time to reflect on their behavior; others, however, do not.
Yet the need to regulate both good and bad people long preceded the BE revolution. law, mostly because of their differing levels of internalized moral and legal norms. The solution to dealing with a variety of people lies in the common denominator approach, along with a nuanced use of incentives to prevent crowding-out effects. But when it comes to differences between people's level of deliberation, it is not clear that there is a common denominator at work. And even with the spotlight aimed at the new approach, the previous dichotomies of extrinsic and intrinsic compliance motivations remain relevant, maybe even more so than before. We are now facing the need to regulate people across two dichotomies, which are not necessarily orthogonal: their internalization of norms and their mode of reasoning.
Despite our growing understanding of good people, no one-size-fits-all policy suggests itself. For the legal policy maker to be able to use the rich knowledge about people's bounded ethicality, we need to create a multidimensional taxonomy of legal doctrines and of the various instruments that states can use in their attempt to modify human behavior. The deviation from the assumption that an actor did wrong because he or she had planned on doing so is justified only in some legal doctrines and only with regard to certain situations. Being able to recognize ex ante the areas in which people's lack of moral awareness is expected to be significant can change the balance of the tools that should be used. There is a great need for a richer view of the interaction between law and human behavior that accounts for the effect of legal intervention on good and bad people alike.
Limitations in the current behavioral ethics literature
There also needs to be a deeper understanding of tradeoffs, which should be taken into account when evaluating the effectiveness of government intervention in changing
behavior. An example of such context sensitivity appears in this book when I address the area of ethical decision making. Empirical results show that accountability is effective in undermining unconscious biases 47 However this might not be the case for bad people who are looking for ways to rationalize their intentional bad behaviors. The inability to predict the effect of various legal interventions on behavior demonstrates the need for evidence-based behavioral-legal scholarship. Legal scholarship must recognize that behavioral findings are not merely on the sidelines but are at the heart of the theory and practice of legal enforcement. It must also demonstrate to scholars in the behavioral and public policy fields that law is a unique area that cannot be overlooked. 48 To regulate 44 The assumption of a one-way influence is problematic on many grounds. In the area of nondeliberative choice, LGOOD will attempt to suggest that understanding what intervention methods work in what circumstances can help basic science gain clarity regarding the interplay between deliberative and non-deliberative choice. 45 See Feldman and Lobel. supra note 38. 46 For example, in many economics papers about contracts or employment discrimination, the legal doctrine is presented rather naively. The nudge approach often ignores alternative solutions offered by the doctrine itself. This approach ignores that fact that they decide what seems to be the right thing to do based on their highly motivated perception of the situation. Their behavior may be immoral, but they still view themselves as moral people because they frame the situation in such a way that it "allows" immoral behavior. Clearly, people's self-image of being cooperative or moral is not based on acting morally. Another relevant study on moral intuition is Tom Tyler's seminal work, "Why People Obey the Law." 53 Tyler suggests that people decide to obey the law because the law is legitimate. Many studies in the social cognitive literature discuss mechanisms that either prevent people from knowing in advance that they are violating the law or enable them to develop an ex post approach that uses various strategies to change people's perception of the wrongfulness of their behavior. Ariely et al. 54 have shown that people do not believe that it is legitimate to cheat more if one is financially deprived. But when they were manipulated into thinking that they were deprived (by receiving a smaller amount of money in a game) they were quick to start cheating. This finding shows the importance of explicit judgment not only relative to implicit judgment but also to actual behavior. The methodological observation of Greenvald and Banaji 55 on the power of implicit judgment may have even stronger force: because people love themselves so much, there is no reason for them to admit to themselves that they behave amorally. 
THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: Chapter 1

Structure of the book
As described earlier, this book is divided into 11 chapters. The first two chapters focus on the theoretical dimension of the interaction between BE and the law. In the last part of this chapter I offer a few words of caution to states that wish to use the knowledge of behavioral ethics to modify legal policy making. The field is relatively young, and it is not yet able to answer important questions with regard to ethical biases, such as their internal mechanisms, the awareness of the existence of biases, and the variation between people in the ability to overcome those biases.
However, I strongly believe that legal scholarship cannot wait for a consensus to be reached on those questions. Although we do not know the percentage of good versus bad people, the extent of involvement of the automatic system in decision making, or the level of awareness of its role, the recognition that a substantial portion of the population engages in non-deliberative choices is enough to shift the normative debate. The chapter concludes that knowing the ratio of people of each 56 In the next chapter, I examine the relevancy of paradigms such as egotism (sharing first names, birthdays); embodiment (washing hands, closing one eye, carrying weight); food consumption (drinking coffee, glucose studies); priming the ten commandments, eyes, faces, money, dirty money and various situational cues that trigger compliance (teddy bears). type and the exact level of people's awareness is secondary in importance to the fact that such variation exists and that legal policy making has to recognize the need to adopt more than one type of intervention to deal with different modes of awareness. We cannot afford to wait until we know more before we act.
In Chapter 3, on traditional enforcement mechanisms, I reexamine some behavioral theories that explain people's motivation to follow the law.
One of the key arguments of this book is that, to deal with good people, we do not need to abandon everything we know about legal enforcement; we just need to revise our current understanding of how traditional intervention methods can influence different types of people. Chapter 3 focuses on traditional enforcement methods that were not intended to take into account dual reasoning and the need to deal with non-deliberative choices. Nevertheless, many of those traditional paradigms are highly sensitive to the behavioral revolution. Among the concepts reviewed in this chapter are deterrence, morality and fairness, incentives, social norms, and the expressive function of the law.
In this chapter I examine the techniques that governments use to regulate behavior. 57 These techniques fall into two categories: traditional approaches, which presuppose that (bad) people act deliberately, and softer regulation, which for the most part assumes an absence of full deliberation by (good) people. Traditional 62 Another technique reviewed in this chapter focuses on disclosure and transparency, which assume that people engage in deliberation, so that given enough information, they will make the right decision or will avoid making the The BE perspective also differs from that of most of the compliance motivation literature, including Kelman's basic paradigm on compliance and Tyler's procedural fairness approach. According to his approach, the main difference is between people with an extrinsic versus those with an intrinsic commitment to obey the law. I claim instead that in many cases people do not make an informed decision about the right way to act based on their level of commitment to the law. The approach I advocate suggests that the effect of morality on law operates in a completely different way, at least in some cases of legal noncompliance. The core argument of BE is that in a considerable number of cases people do not engage in any form of deliberative moral reasoning before deciding whether or not to obey the law. Many bad deeds are not seen as such by the people who commit them, and therefore they are not always aware that they might be about to perpetrate a moral wrong. It follows that the focus should be on identifying both the situational and the personality characteristics that will increase the likelihood that people will recognize the moral flaw in their behavior. 65 People's lack of awareness of their wrongdoing, a central claim of BE research, renders ineffective the traditional enforcement mechanisms (e.g., fines, procedural justice processes) presented in Chapter 3. These mechanisms are based on the assumption that people who behave badly engage in some level of a deliberative process before they reach the decision-making stage. According to the traditional approach, certain techniques, most notably incentives, 66 that they do not act in an unethical manner in situations relevant to legal and public policy. In the last three decades, this approach, based on the neoclassical economic doctrine of rational choice, has been challenged by theories based on the behavioral approach to human judgment and decision making. Various alternatives and modifications in regulating human behavior, going beyond simple incentives, have been offered over the years, including some in my own research. For example, the following interventions have been proposed: those that change the wording of incentives (to make people more likely to consider their ethical behavior), that increase legitimacy (by mandating employee voice procedures in workplace), that account for crowding out (e.g., when people would rather do things without being compensated for them), that increase the sensitivity to cognitive limitations (e.g., in examining how people engage in aggressive interpretation when contractual obligations are framed as a potential loss rather than a potential gain). 67 Nonetheless the challenge to legal enforcement posed by the BE perspective has not been explored in this context, mainly because of the dominance of economics in the interplay between law and psychology. In the chapter I review the studies that have demonstrated the limitations of each intervention when dealing with people who lack a full awareness of their behavior; these limitations are evident in the few famous failures of the nudge-based approach. For example, initially the default rule-having to opt in versus out when donating-seemed to a very effective nudge in increasing rates of organ donation; however, later studies showed that the nudge was actually much less effective. 71 The message, "Save more tomorrow," shown to be a strong nudge in pension savings, also turned out to be less effective in the long term. 72 Generally speaking, giving people full information proved to be problematic; 73 debiasing was found to produce limited results, 74 as was disclosure of conflicts of interest, which in many contexts ended up having the opposite effect from the desired one. 75 Masking personal information in hiring applications was found to be more effective in reducing biases against minorities than against women. 76 Thus predicting when and how to change behavior through incentives has proven to be difficult. 77
Chapter 5: The role of Social Norms in legal compliance Chapter 5 focuses on the social norms in legal compliance. This chapter was separated from chapter 3 and 4 due to its interaction with both traditional and non-traditional means of intervention. Hence, this relatively short paper outlines the main literature on the role of social norms, with particular focus on non-deliberative processes in how people perceive social norms and in how it affects their behavior. Policy, 35(1) , 011-051. 83 Although as is explained in this chapter, there are some general tendencies to obey the law. This tendency is supported also with regard to the citizenship approach to legal compliance where people obey the law simply because it is the law. It is interesting to examine whether people who obey laws simply because they are laws should be seen as intrinsically committed individuals. Research conducted by various scholars 86 suggests that the interaction between intrinsic motivation and implicit behaviors is more complex than what the legal literature assumes. 87 My research is based on the assumption that governments must invest in improving legitimacy and morality of law even in areas that seem to involve automatic behavior. As an alternative to focusing on individual behavior, the chapter examines the Chapter 9. The corruption of good people Individuals often feel that they are not being treated fairly by employers, public officials, or people whom they hire to attend to their best interests in various capacities such as lawyers, physicians, architects, and accountants. Professionals whom we trust to behave responsibly and to focus primarily on our interests (when we hire them), on the interest of the public (in the case of public officials), or on the workplace (in the case of the employer) turn out instead to be influenced by personal or competing institutional interests. For example, at the workplace, an individual who may be up for promotion may develop the impression that other candidates are more likely to know the decision makers personally and thus have an unfair advantage. In the areas of corruption and discrimination, the notion of trust in the system is highly important because it affects individuals' ability to trust the professionals who are expected to attend to their interest (lawyers, physicians, etc.), public officials (municipal officers), and hiring managers (in employment situations).
Often the potential deviation from objectivity and impartiality is relatively subtle, and the professional can easily deny or ignore it based on legitimate rationales.
In hiring or promotion contexts and regarding the exercise of professional duties, subtle deviations usually occur in situations in which there is more than one legitimate choice, and therefore there is room for various interpretations of what is the right thing to do. In the presence of vagueness, people have greater room for self-deception and motivated reasoning, and we expect that good people are more likely to find ways to justify their bad behavior. Some argue that such deviations are therefore beyond the 88 Here are a few examples of subtle conflict of interest situations: voting on the academic promotion of a friend, consulting for a firm that may compete in the future with one's current employer, when a civil servant treats an affluent entrepreneur with greater consideration than usual, when a physician performs a procedure because he is more comfortable with it but it may not be what the patient would most benefit from, or a lawyer rejecting a plea bargain or a settlement that is in the best interests of here client. of government, 91 and corruption arises in a different form in the private sector (e.g., in the area of corporate governance).
Research on corruption and conflict of interest contains numerous examples of
situations in which people who exhibit professional and moral responsibility have allowed their self-interest, admittedly without full awareness, to prevail over fulfilling their duties. 92,93 One of the most studied areas in this context is the conflict of interest of physicians who conduct clinical studies financed by pharmaceutical companies or who prescribe drugs based on their relationship to such companies. 94 Most clinicians do not think they are doing anything wrong when they prescribe a certain course of treatment to their patients while ignoring the subtle effects of competing interests. In many similar situations, most good people may believe that the option that promotes their self-interest is also the correct one. We can include in this group lawyers dealing with their clients, executives acting on behalf of shareholders, prosecutors making plea bargains, and academics deciding whether their colleagues should be promoted.
In the context of implicit corruption, psychological processes such as selfdeception, elastic justification, moral disengagement, and motivated reasoning enable people to behave unethically without recognizing their wrongdoing. 95 As in research on prejudice and discrimination, a vast literature suggests that self-interest may influence people without their recognizing its effect on their behavior. 96 Moore et al. 97 showed that people truly believed their own biased judgments and had limited ability to recognize that their behavior was affected by self-interest. 98 These conclusions are also supported by the 91 For example, a 2012 report found that all European countries suffer from political corruption at some level. 92 There is a wealth of research on the prevalence of conflict of interest in almost every field. See, for example, Rodwin, supra note 67. 93 Thompson, supra note 68, 573-573. understanding of implicit corruption and the fact that it is difficult to manage. 103 Various studies have shown that disclosure, which has been regarded as the ultimate solution for curbing corruption, does not work for implicit processes and can even have the reverse effect from that desired. 104 Chapter 10. Managing discrimination by good people at the workplace and beyond Employment discrimination is one of the most serious problems in labor markets worldwide and so has attracted more attention than other forms of discrimination (e.g., financial, residential). Anti-discrimination employment laws prohibit specific forms of employment discrimination; for example, that based on race, sex, religion, and age. 105 But usually these laws do not address each form of discrimination individually, nor do they take into account the different sociological and psychological mechanisms behind each form. In most countries, the legal approach is a general one, and similar remedies and prohibitions are applied to various forms of discrimination. Civil Rights Act, Title VII (1964). prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of religion, race, and sex. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) protects applicants and employees who are 40 years old and older from discrimination. Both laws are enforced by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In the United States, the difference between the categories of discrimination is mostly due to constitutional reasons rather than behavioral ones. social and cognitive research in intergroup psychology, 106 which has focused on stereotyping processes. 107 Fiske's work is especially promising for legal scholars because it offers a nuanced and multidimensional approach to discrimination. 108 Psychological insights have been incorporated into the study of employment discrimination to a greater extent than in any other legal area. 109 Legal scholars, most notably Krieger, have suggested that many biased employment decisions result not from discriminatory motivations but from a variety of unintentional categorization errors. 110 Considering the richness of behavioral findings on employment discrimination, the lack of responsiveness of the law to this knowledge is frustrating. Krieger and Fiske 111 discussed the outdated nature of US laws in this area from both jurisprudential and practical aspects. For 106 example, the law requires showing intention and finding evidence for what has occurred at the stage of discrimination, 112 but falls short of providing a comprehensive legal alternative to implicit discrimination. Some legal scholars have acknowledged that most acts of discrimination are the product of a variety of unintentional errors. 113 As in most other types of research on nondeliberative choice, the recent literature on discrimination reveals the problems associated with automatic reasoning, but offers almost no suggestions for the format of a new legal policy that would address both deliberative and non-deliberative discriminatory behavior. For the most part, the law still looks for a smoking gun when identifying employers as committing acts of discrimination and prejudice.
Chapter 11Conclusion
It is important both theoretically and practically to understand that there is no onesize-fits-all solution to incorporating considerations of the intrinsic versus extrinsic dynamic into government policies. It is difficult to predict the accumulated effect of these mechanisms without taking into account the context, and in any case, the accuracy of predictions will always be limited. I therefore recommend that theoretical efforts be 112 A vast body of federal employment statutes provides protection against discrimination based on group membership. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 supra note 110, for example, prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from paying different wages based on the gender of the employee (but does not prohibit other discriminatory employment practices). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age. The American with Disabilities Act(1990) prohibits discrimination by employers based on physical or mental handicaps. In recent years the legal situation is similar in Israeli courts, although the courts are aware of the existence of unconscious discrimination and try to objectively test for discrimination ( H.C.J. 104/87 Dr. Neomi Nevo v. The National Labor Court, 1987., 09-9690 Ababa v. A.A 101 Group , 2013). Nevertheless, the vast majority of misconduct in this area never reaches the courts; this is true of employment discrimination in general ( Nelson, R. L., & Bridges, W. P. (1999) . Legalizing gender inequality: Courts, markets and unequal pay for women in America (Vol. 16). Cambridge University Press.) and in Israel in particular: Sharon Rabin Margaliot, The Slippery Case of Age Discrimination-How Does One Prove Its Existence?, 44 Advoc 529,537 (2000) . See also Cerullo, C. (2013). Everyone's a Little Bit Racist: Reconciling Implicit Bias and Title VII. Fordham L. Rev., 82, 127., for a review of the treatment of implicit biases by US courts. First, what is the nature of the behavior we want to encourage? 114
It is important to take into account the behavior that the policy maker wishes to promote. One cannot excel in recycling or even in organ donation; 115 for the most part, policy makers care only about one's activity level and willingness to pay for engaging in recycling. In various other legal contexts, however, the quality of the behavior is more important. For example, in whistleblowing or blood donation it is less helpful to think about employees who do it for purely extrinsic reasons. In a legal context, where extra-role activity is desired, the cost of reducing intrinsic motivation increases, and one should be more cautious in introducing extrinsic motives.
Second, what proportion of the target population do we need to cooperate? 116
When the level of intrinsic motivation is heterogeneous, what proportion of the target population do we need to comply?
In the context of trade secrets, we need the cooperation of 100% of the target population, from those with the highest level of intrinsic motivation to those with the lowest. Therefore, the effect of reducing the intrinsic motivation of committed employees may be secondary to making sure that even those without intrinsic motivation remain loyal to their employers. In the case of whistleblowing the exact opposite is true, and we need the cooperation of only some of the employees to come forward when some illegal activity is taking place within the organization. Therefore, the policy maker can focus primarily on those who are high on intrinsic motivation. 117 For obvious reasons, we may not even want to provide incentives to those without intrinsic motivation because of fear of false reports by bounty hunters. Finally, in the context of recycling, we are interested in averaging, so that as many people as possible recycle as much as possible. In this 114 To date, I have presented data about three main types of activities (trade secrets, recycling, whistle-blowing): I use these three examples to help us think about the importance of being aware of legal contexts when policy makers attempt to decide how to provide incentives for certain behaviors without harming individuals' intrinsic motivations. 115 But this is not the case with regard to blood donation. 116 see Benabou and Tirole supra note 88 117 This argument is obviously oversimplified, and fine-tuning is highly needed here. situation, we have no preference for either high or low intrinsically motivated individuals; therefore, the balancing consideration for the policy maker is whether or not to use extrinsic motivation and, if yes, determining which types of incentives to use.
Third, how important is it to think that others are being motivated by intrinsic motives?
People are biased in their perceptions of what others are doing and for which reasons. It is clear, however, that the effect of knowing why other people do what they do is different depending on the context, the nature of the relationship, the level of reciprocity, the importance of others' motivation to one's evaluation of its authenticity, and more. Presumably, the closer the behavior is to areas where one would expect identity-related factors to be dominant, the greater the damage is to the other from viewing one's motivation as being extrinsically motivated. In commercial contexts, we are less likely to find that extrinsic motivation harms perceptions of authenticity in the behavior of others. A relatively straightforward aspect we may want to consider is the visibility of the behavior and the ability to measure both its quantity and quality (recycling in houses vs. loyalty to an employer in keeping proprietary information secret).
It is safe to assume that, with more visible and measureable behavior, the policy maker should care less about harming intrinsic motivation whose main advantage is its limited dependence on external measurement. Thinking about these context dimensions could lead the policy maker to focus efforts on protecting intrinsic motivation in the most suitable contexts.
In the next section of the conclusion chapter, I examine the ability of law to change people's implicit tendency to behave unethically, relating this discussion to the research conducted by scholars such as Devine and Inzlicht on the ability to change peoples' intrinsic tendency to rely on stereotypes. Furthermore because the focus of this book is on legal enforcement, I examine whether existing mechanisms through which the law could change the social meaning of certain behaviors could end up also affecting the unethical behavior of people that is based on implicit processes.
The concluding section of this chapter summarizes the many important questions we have discussed in the book and suggests that they remain open to further research.
THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: Chapter 1
Because some of the most important interactions between psychology and law have not yet been studied, the book cannot be expected to resolve all these issues or even address them. In this section I focus on emerging research directions. First, I present the set of jurisprudential questions that should be addressed more extensively, such as free will, autonomy, variations among people, equality, and the role of law relative to morality. As long as these questions are being addressed mainly from a legal enforcement perspective, 
